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Forthcoming: Journal of Conflict Resolution1
Spending on national defense is a good example of an international
public good where one country’s supply of national defense may be a
substitute for another country’s supply.  When two or more nations or blocs
with conflicting goals engage in a competitive increase in their national
defense, an arms race will occur. In this paper I investigate the spillover
effects of non-cooperative and cooperative spending on national defense of
allied countries of the two conflicting blocs using static and leader-follower
game models.
In their classic paper Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) apply the theory
of the private provision of public goods to countries and conclude that all
allied countries lose when they determine the levels of spending on national
defense non-cooperatively. If allied countries can cooperate, it would benefit
all of them.
1  On the contrary, Bruce (1990) considers a three-country model
with two allies and an adversary and shows that all countries may be worse
off when the allies cooperate on defense spending than when they do not.
This is because defense spending by the adversary rises in response to a
cooperative increase in defense spending by the alliance, so that cooperation
among allies in setting defense spending is not necessarily welfare-improving.
Even if allied countries can cooperate, cooperation will not attain a better
outcome than non-cooperation. This is an interesting result.  “The whole
notion of suboptimality of defense provision must be reconsidered when
adversaries’ reactions are included”. (Sandler and Hartley 1995, p.42)
Bruce’s (1990) analysis is, however, restrictive in that one bloc has two
countries and another has a single country.2
In the real world allied blocs usually have multiple countries.  When
the number of countries within the same bloc is large, gains from cooperation
will also be large. Thus, if each bloc has a large number of allied countries, we
might expect that cooperative behavior attains a better outcome than non-
cooperative behavior.  By developing a simple multi-country model of an
arms race between two blocs, this paper investigates to what extent such a
conjecture is plausible.  It is shown that the countries in one bloc may gain by
cooperating if the countries in the other bloc cooperate, while they may lose
by cooperating if the adversaries do not cooperate.  Furthermore, I show that
in a leader-follower game the leader bloc will be better off when cooperating,
while the follower bloc will be worse off when cooperating.  These results
suggest that there are cases where allied cooperation may still be beneficial
even if the adversarial response of the opposing bloc is explicitly included.
The organization of this paper is as follows.  The next section
develops a simple analytical framework, while the third section  investigates
non-cooperative and cooperative solutions in a static game.  The fourth
section considers a leader-follower game.  Finally the last section concludes
the paper.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Assume that there are n+m countries and two opposing blocs α  and
β  in the world, consisting of n and m countries, respectively.  Country i’s
utility function is specified as a Cobb-Douglas type:
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where U
i is welfare of country i, ci is private consumption of country i, and
Gi is the benefit of an international public good (or national security) for
country i.  An initial endowment of national security A>0 is incorporated into
equation (1) so that the total level of national security is positive;  i G A+ >0.
The population in each country is assumed fixed and normalized at unity so
that we abstract from the public good nature of national defense within the
country.
Gi is given by
Gg g ii i j j
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where gi is the international public good (or national defense) provided by
country i and ε ij is the degree of externalities of the public good provided by
country j to country i.
2  If ε ij=1 for all i, j, then the public good is a standard
pure public good where each country’s defense is perfectly substitutable.  If
ε ij= 1 −  between enemies, there exists an ‘arms race’ or ‘red Queen’
relationship where an equal increase in national defense by a country and its
enemy leaves the national security of both unchanged.  In this paper we
assume that ε ij = 1 for ij , ∈ α  or ij , ∈ β  and ε ij =− 1 for ij ∈∈ α β ,  or
ij ∈∈ β α , .
3  All countries within the same bloc are “perfect allies” and they
treat the countries in the opposing bloc as a “perfect” enemy.  Thus, from
equation (2), we have
j i G G − = ,f o r   ij ∈∈ α β ,  or ij ∈∈ β α , .
Country i’s budget constraint is given by4
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where Yi is exogenously given national income of country i.  Adding ∑
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Production technologies are linear and identical across countries, and units
are chosen such that the constant marginal rate of transformation between
ci and gi is unity for all countries.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM NASH EQUILIBRIUM NASH EQUILIBRIUM NASH EQUILIBRIUM
For simplicity we assume that all countries in the same bloc are
identical and behave in the same way;  namely, they either cooperate or do
not cooperate with one another.  We do not investigate the case of partial
cooperation where some allied countries cooperate, while the rest do not.  By
investigating the potential gain of cooperation, we could explore the cost of
free-riding situation where one country does not cooperate and the rest of the
allied countries cooperate.
NON-COOPERATIVE SOLUTION
First, we investigate the case where each country determines its own
national defense taking the national defense expenditure of every other
country as given.  In other words, in this section we will assume alliances do
not undertake any cooperative decision making with respect to spending on
allied national defense and demonstrate Nash behavior.
45
  The Nash reaction function of country i of bloc α  follows from
country i’s maximizing its utility (1), subject to its budget constraint
A mg g n Y G A c j i + − − + = + + β α α α α ) 1 ( ,( 4 )
while taking national defense of the other countries gg j αβ ,  as given.  Here g j α
denotes national defense by country j (≠ i) of bloc α  and  gβ  denotes national
defense by any identical country of bloc β .
From the first-order condition with respect to  α G , we have
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Since all countries of bloc α  are identical, we have  gg ij αα =  at any Nash
solution.  Hence, substituting  α α α g g g j i = =  into the above equation, we
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α g  is an increasing function of both its own national income and defense
spending by the enemy bloc.  Similarly, the reaction function of country i of



















α β β .( 7 )
Henceforth, we call country α  (or β ) the representative country of
bloc α  (or β ).  In Figure 1 curve X represents country α ’s reaction curve,
while curve Y represents country β ’s reaction curve, both of which are
upward sloping.  An increase in national defense in country α  stimulates6
national defense in country β , and vice versa, so that national defense is a
strategic complement, reflecting an arms race between rival blocs.  Point N at
the intersection of both curves represents the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium.
From equations (6) and (7) the Nash equilibrium levels of national
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For simplicity we assume henceforth that  . Y Y Y = = β α   It follows from (8-1)
that 
N gα  increases with m; when the number of countries of the rival bloc
increases, spending on national defense per country also increases.  This is
because an increase in the number of enemy countries raises the threat to
countries of the other bloc, producing a negative income effect as security
decreases.  However, 
N gα  decreases with n; when the number of allied
countries increases, spending on national defense of those countries falls, due
to the positive income effect from greater spillovers.  National security of
each country is increasing with the number of allied countries, which is
consistent with McGuire (1974).
From equations (8-1) and (8-2), we can solve for  α α G A c + , ,  β β G A c + , .
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Equation (9) means that welfare of each country increases with the number7
of allied countries, while it decreases with the number of enemy countries,
which is intuitively plausible.
ALLIED COOPERATION
Bloc α  Cooperates And Bloc β  Cooperates
We next consider the case where allied countries may cooperate
within each bloc although there is no cooperation (or negotiation) between
the two blocs.  First of all, let us investigate the case where all countries of
bloc α  cooperate together and all countries of bloc β  cooperate together as
well.  Consider the joint optimization problem of country α .  Adding equation
(3) up over all n identical countries and allowing  gg ij αα = , bloc α ’s
consolidated budget constraint may be written as
A mg nY A G nc + − = + + β α α α . (10)
Thus country α  jointly maximizes its utility (1) subject to the above
consolidated budget constraint, taking gβ  as given.  From the first-order
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Note that if n=1, equation (11) reduces to (6).  When n>1, the slope of
the reaction function, dg dg αβ / , is given as m/2n, which is less than the slope
of the reaction function in the non-cooperative case, m/(n+1).  Namely, when8
the adversarial bloc β  raises defense spending, countries of bloc α  would
react by spending more in the non-cooperative case than in the cooperative
case.  Due to the arms race, an increase in  β g  induces bloc α  to raise  α g .
When bloc α  cooperates, each member recognizes the positive spillover from
the increase in defense spending by the other allied countries.  However,
when it does not cooperate, each member does not recognize the positive
spillover from the allied countries’ spending, so that it raises  α g  more in
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In Figure 1 curve S represents the reaction curve of country α  when
all countries of bloc α  cooperate, and curve T represents the reaction curve of
country β  when all countries of bloc β  cooperate.  At the intersection of curve
S and curve T, denoted by point C, a Nash equilibrium is reached that
corresponds to the case where both bloc α  and bloc β  cooperate.  The
equilibrium levels of  gg αβ ,  at point C are respectively given as;
n
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Then, we have
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The total marginal rate of substitution of  α G A+  with respect to  α c ,
) /( )] / /( ) ( / [ α α α
α
α
α G A nc c U G A U n + = ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ , equals 1, or the marginal cost of9
providing the public good, which is nothing but the Samuelson rule. Although
the Samuelson rule holds for each bloc, there is no cooperation between the
two blocs, so that the cooperative solution attains a second best equilibrium
rather than the first best.  The theory of second best cautions that utility is
not necessarily higher at the cooperative solution than at the non-cooperative
solution.
Bloc α  Cooperates, While Bloc β  Does Not Cooperate
In the case where countries of bloc α  cooperate together, while
countries of bloc β  do not cooperate, country α ’s reaction curve is given as
equation (11), while country β ’s reaction curve is given as equation (7).  Then,
the quasi-cooperative equilibrium levels of  gg αβ ,  at point P in Figure 1 are
respectively given as;
n m
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where the Samuelson rule holds for bloc α  only.
Bloc α  Does Not Cooperate, While Bloc β  Cooperates
Finally the case where countries of bloc α  do not cooperate, while
countries of bloc β  cooperate together is a counterpart of the last subsection.10
COMPARISON OF FOUR EQUILIBRIA
We are ready to compare four Nash equilibria;  (1) both countries α
and β  do not cooperate at point N, (2) country α  cooperates, while country β
does not cooperate at point P, (3) country α  does not cooperate, while country
β  cooperates at point Q, and (4) both countries α  and β  cooperate at point C,
respectively.
In order to internalize the positive spillover effect between allies
within the same bloc, it would be desirable for countries of the same bloc, say,
α , to have a treaty for determining national defense cooperatively.  By doing
so, national defense of the bloc is stimulated, which benefits all countries of
the bloc.  We call this the OZ effect for Olson and Zeckhauser.  However,
countries of the rival bloc β  would react by raising their spending on national
defense, which would hurt countries of bloc α .  We call this the Bruce effect.
 5
If the negative spillover effect due to the reaction of the opposing bloc
outweighs the positive spillover effect due to cooperation between allies, such
cooperation hurts countries of bloc α .  This possibility was first pointed by
Bruce (1990) in the case of n=2 and m=1.
Table 1 depicts country α ’s welfare at four Nash equilibria points.
Country α  is likely better off when it does not cooperate within the bloc if
country β  does not cooperate.  Namely, if n=m, we always have
n m n m
2 2 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( + < + + .
However, if n ≥  10 and m = 2, we have
n m n m
2 2 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( + > + + ,
which means that country α  gains by cooperating when the number of allied11
countries is very large.
Table 1 also shows that country α  loses by cooperating when country
β  cooperates if n is less than 4,
2 ) 2 ( n + < n 9  if n<4.
However, for n ≥  5,  n n 9 ) 2 (
2 > + ; the countries in one bloc gain by cooperating
if the countries in the other bloc cooperate.
Several remarks are in order.  First, when the number of countries
within the same bloc increases, gains from cooperation would also increase.
Thus, if each bloc has a large number of allied countries, we would expect
that cooperative behavior improves welfare.  We could say that the OZ effect
may well dominate the Bruce effect in a world of endogenous threat by
adversarial countries when the number of allied countries is relatively large.
Second, it is less likely the case that countries will gain from
cooperation if their adversaries do not cooperate.  This is because the model
predicts that when one bloc raises defense spending by cooperating, countries
of the adversarial bloc will react by spending more in the non-cooperative
case than in the cooperative case. The arms-race reaction by the enemy bloc
to an increase in the rival’s defense spending is larger in the non-cooperative
case than in the cooperative case since each country in the enemy bloc does
not recognize the positive spillovers from allied members’ increase in defense
spending in the non-cooperative case.  Thus, in such a case the Bruce effect
may dominate the OZ effect even if the number of allied countries is large.
Third, while the alliance may gain from cooperation when the
number of countries is large, this is also the case where the bargaining costs12
of reaching a cooperative solution are high.  Hence in a small alliance,
cooperation is likely but welfare reducing, while in a large alliance
cooperation is unlikely, but welfare improving.
Finally, during the Cold War both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had
many allies.  We could say that the Warsaw Pact cooperated due to the strong
leadership by USSR.  If so, NATO might have large benefits from
cooperation.
LEADER-FOLLOWER GAME LEADER-FOLLOWER GAME LEADER-FOLLOWER GAME LEADER-FOLLOWER GAME
We consider the Stackelberg leader-follower game where one bloc, for
whatever reason, can make a credible first move.  This asymmetry may arise
because the bloc is dominant in some sense or has a less flexible environment
so that the level of defense spending it chooses is credibly maintained.
Without loss of generality, we assume that bloc β  acts as a Stackelberg
leader.
BLOC α  COOPERATES, WHILE BLOC β  DOES NOT COOPERATE
We first consider the case where country β  is a non-cooperative
leader.  A country of bloc β  acts as a Stackelberg leader against country α
but still behaves a Nash competitor with respect to the allies
6.  When country
α  cooperates, its reaction function is given by equation (11).  Then, country i
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which substituted into equation (3) gives



















the first-stage response function of country β .  Substituting equation (17-1)
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The marginal rate of substitution of  β G A+  with respect to  β c  now equals 2 in
the leader-follower game, not 1 as in the static game.  Since the leader
country β  now recognizes the negative reaction of the follower country α ,
the effective marginal cost of providing the public good rises for country β
from 1 to 2.
BLOC α  COOPERATES AND BLOC β  COOPERATES
In the case where countries within bloc β  cooperate in the first stage
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subject to equation (3).  Considering the first-order condition with respect to14
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at the second stage of the game.  When  Y Y Y = = β α , the outcome in the
leader-follower game is
n
A Y m n
U
16





A Y n m
U
8




BLOC α  DOES NOT COOPERATE AND BLOC β  DOES NOT
COOPERATE
When the follower bloc does not cooperate at the second stage of the
game, the reaction function of country α  is given as equation (6).  Thus
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subject to equation (3).  Considering the first-order condition with respect to






















β α β . (21-1)











) 1 )( 1 (
1 ) 1 2 (









= β α α , (21-2)
at the second stage of the game.
When  Y Y Y = = β α , the outcome in the leader-follower game consists of15
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BLOC α  DOES NOT COOPERATE, WHILE BLOC β  COOPERATES
In this case country β  jointly maximizes
)
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subject to equation (3).  Considering the first-order condition with respect to
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at the second stage of the game.
When  Y Y Y = = β α , the outcome in the leader-follower game consists of
2
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COMPARISON OF FOUR EQUILIBRIA
Table 2 summarizes outcomes of the leader bloc β  and the follower
bloc α  for n=m and A=1 in the leader-follower game
7.  The cooperative
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The intuition is as follows.  When the leader bloc cooperates, it enjoys the
positive spillover effect from increased spending on national defense by allied16
countries, while it suffers from the negative income effect from increased
defense spending by enemy countries.  The leader country may set its defense
spending less than in the static game since it anticipates the reaction of the
enemy bloc.  By doing so, the leader bloc can choose the spending level in such
a way that the positive spillover effect would outweigh the negative income
effect; the OZ effect dominates the Bruce effect.
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The intuition is as follows.  Since the leader bloc recognizes the response of
the follower bloc, its national defense is larger when the follower bloc
cooperates than when the follower bloc does not cooperate.  Thus, the follower
bloc receives greater negative spillovers when it cooperates than when it does
not cooperate.  The Bruce effect dominates the OZ effect.
We could say that the Warsaw Pact was the leader and NATO was the
follower during the Cold War.  If so, the Warsaw Pact might gain by
cooperating and NATO might also gain by non-cooperating.
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION CONCLUSION CONCLUSION
 This paper has investigated the implications of non-cooperative and
cooperative spending on defense expenditures of allied countries of the two
rival blocs using static and leader-follower game models of arms races.  It is
well known that in the three-country world with two allies and an adversary
all countries may be better off when the allies do not cooperate than they do.17
By incorporating multi-countries into two opposing blocs respectively, we
have shown that if the number of allied countries is large, the cooperative
behavior may well attain a better outcome although the negative spillover
from the rival bloc is high; the countries in one bloc gain by cooperating.
Furthermore, in a leader-follower game cooperative behavior of the leader
bloc will gain.  The OZ effect may well be valid in several cases in the world of
endogenous threat by adversarial countries.  We have also shown that
countries will likely lose from cooperation if their adversaries do not
cooperate. In a leader-follower game the follower bloc will likely lose by
cooperating.  Thus, the Bruce effect is also important when adversaries’
reactions are included.
It has been assumed that all countries in the same bloc behave in the
same way.  The analysis could be generalized to allow for partial cooperation
among allied countries.  The cost of cooperating has not been included in the
model.  And the cost of organizing the coalition is probably increasing in the
number of coalition members.  It would be useful to model the cost of
cooperating explicitly.  It will be also useful to investigate the impact of allied
cooperation on arms races in a dynamic setting.18
Notes: Notes: Notes: Notes:
1.  See also Sandler (1977) and Kemp (1984) among others.  They highlight
the importance of allied cooperation in setting defense spending.
2.  Although the weighted-sum technology is common in the literature, other
formulations such as weakest-link and best-shot could be useful.  See
McGuire (1990) and Sandler (1998), among others.
3. Ihori (1992) considers the general case of adversarial relations with respect
to ε .
4. As discussed in detail by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), Andreoni
(1988), and Bruce (1990), a non-negativity constraint on providing public
goods may well be binding as a solution if the number of enemy countries
becomes large.  In order to present the results in the simplest form possible,
we only consider the case where all countries spend a positive amount on
defense.
5. The assumption of  ) ( 1 j i ij ≠ − = ε  is the strongest case for the Bruce effect.
Furthermore, the utility function (1) implies that the marginal propensity to
consume the public good is 0.5, which is very high.  This also raises the
magnitude of the Bruce effect.
6. In this formulation it is assumed that the leader can credibly commit itself
to its defense spending against the follower bloc and anticipate its response.
The leader still takes as given defense spending of the allied countries.  In
this sense, the Stackelberg process is partial.  Hayashi (2000) uses the
similar concept.
7. The qualitative results are almost the same even if n ≠  m.  Namely,  we
still obtain the result that the leader bloc gains by cooperating.  However, the
follower bloc might not lose by cooperating although such a case is unlikely to
occur.19
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N means non-cooperation and C means cooperation.22
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N means non-cooperation and C means cooperation.











Figure 1 Four Nash Equilibria